Import Debian changes 1.38.1-5

gvfs (1.38.1-5) unstable; urgency=high

  * Team upload
  * d/p/gvfsdaemon-Check-that-the-connecting-client-is-the-same-u.patch:
    Add missing authentication, preventing a local attacker from connecting
    to an abstract socket address learned from netstat(8) and issuing
    arbitrary D-Bus method calls
  * d/p/gvfsdaemon-Only-accept-EXTERNAL-authentication.patch:
    Harden private D-Bus connection by rejecting the more complicated
    DBUS_COOKIE_SHA1 authentication mechanism and only accepting EXTERNAL.

gvfs (1.38.1-4) unstable; urgency=high

  * Team upload
  * Update from upstream gnome-3-30 branch to fix the admin backend
    (Closes: #929755)
    - Implement query_info_on_read/write to fix some race conditions
      (CVE-2019-12448)
    - Ensure that created files get the correct ownership (CVE-2019-12247)
    - Ensure that copied files get the correct ownership (CVE-2019-12449)
  * Remove obsolete version number from fuse dependency.
    gvfs needs fuse (>= 2.8.4), but that version is older than oldstable,
    so we can safely simplify to "Depends: fuse".
    The versioned dependency is not satisfied by fuse3's unversioned
    "Provides: fuse", but the unversioned dependency is. (Closes: #927221)

debian/changelog

+gvfs (1.38.1-5) unstable; urgency=high
+
+  * Team upload
+  * d/p/gvfsdaemon-Check-that-the-connecting-client-is-the-same-u.patch:
+    Add missing authentication, preventing a local attacker from connecting
+    to an abstract socket address learned from netstat(8) and issuing
+    arbitrary D-Bus method calls
+  * d/p/gvfsdaemon-Only-accept-EXTERNAL-authentication.patch:
+    Harden private D-Bus connection by rejecting the more complicated
+    DBUS_COOKIE_SHA1 authentication mechanism and only accepting EXTERNAL.
+
+ -- Simon McVittie <smcv@debian.org>  Tue, 11 Jun 2019 12:28:34 +0100
+
+gvfs (1.38.1-4) unstable; urgency=high
+
+  * Team upload
+  * Update from upstream gnome-3-30 branch to fix the admin backend
+    (Closes: #929755)
+    - Implement query_info_on_read/write to fix some race conditions
+      (CVE-2019-12448)
+    - Ensure that created files get the correct ownership (CVE-2019-12247)
+    - Ensure that copied files get the correct ownership (CVE-2019-12449)
+  * Remove obsolete version number from fuse dependency.
+    gvfs needs fuse (>= 2.8.4), but that version is older than oldstable,
+    so we can safely simplify to "Depends: fuse".
+    The versioned dependency is not satisfied by fuse3's unversioned
+    "Provides: fuse", but the unversioned dependency is. (Closes: #927221)
+
+ -- Simon McVittie <smcv@debian.org>  Wed, 05 Jun 2019 08:34:17 +0100
+
 gvfs (1.38.1-3) unstable; urgency=high
 
   * Team upload

debian/control

@@ -158,7 +158,7 @@ Description: userspace virtual filesystem - servers
 
 Package: gvfs-fuse
 Architecture: kfreebsd-any linux-any
-Depends: fuse (>= 2.8.4) [linux-any],
+Depends: fuse [linux-any],
          gvfs (= ${binary:Version}),
          ${misc:Depends},
          ${shlibs:Depends}

debian/control.in

@@ -154,7 +154,7 @@ Description: userspace virtual filesystem - servers
 
 Package: gvfs-fuse
 Architecture: kfreebsd-any linux-any
-Depends: fuse (>= 2.8.4) [linux-any],
+Depends: fuse [linux-any],
          gvfs (= ${binary:Version}),
          ${misc:Depends},
          ${shlibs:Depends}

debian/patches/admin-Add-query_info_on_read-write-functionality.patch

+From: Ondrej Holy <oholy@redhat.com>
+Date: Thu, 23 May 2019 10:24:36 +0200
+Subject: admin: Add query_info_on_read/write functionality
+
+Admin backend doesn't implement query_info_on_read/write which might
+potentially lead to some race conditions which aren't really wanted
+especially in case of admin backend. For example, in file_copy_fallback(),
+g_file_query_info() is used if g_file_input_stream_query_info() is not
+supported, which in theory means that the info might be obtained from
+the different file then it is opened. Let's add this missing
+functionality to prevent this possibility.
+
+Origin: upstream, 1.38.2, commit:a1c2e7ecab0d6457fa2227d92e3569c08516eac5
+Bug-CVE: CVE-2019-12448
+Bug-Debian: https://bugs.debian.org/cgi-bin/bugreport.cgi?bug=929755
+---
+ daemon/gvfsbackendadmin.c | 79 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------
+ 1 file changed, 67 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/daemon/gvfsbackendadmin.c b/daemon/gvfsbackendadmin.c
+index 0f84900..c4e4dac 100644
+--- a/daemon/gvfsbackendadmin.c
++++ b/daemon/gvfsbackendadmin.c
+@@ -42,6 +42,8 @@
+ #include "gvfsjobopenforwrite.h"
+ #include "gvfsjobqueryattributes.h"
+ #include "gvfsjobqueryinfo.h"
++#include "gvfsjobqueryinforead.h"
++#include "gvfsjobqueryinfowrite.h"
+ #include "gvfsjobread.h"
+ #include "gvfsjobseekread.h"
+ #include "gvfsjobseekwrite.h"
+@@ -155,6 +157,19 @@ complete_job (GVfsJob *job,
+   g_vfs_job_succeeded (job);
+ }
+ 
++static void
++fix_file_info (GFileInfo *info)
++{
++  /* Override read/write flags, since the above call will use access()
++   * to determine permissions, which does not honor our privileged
++   * capabilities.
++   */
++  g_file_info_set_attribute_boolean (info, G_FILE_ATTRIBUTE_ACCESS_CAN_READ, TRUE);
++  g_file_info_set_attribute_boolean (info, G_FILE_ATTRIBUTE_ACCESS_CAN_WRITE, TRUE);
++  g_file_info_set_attribute_boolean (info, G_FILE_ATTRIBUTE_ACCESS_CAN_DELETE, TRUE);
++  g_file_info_set_attribute_boolean (info, G_FILE_ATTRIBUTE_ACCESS_CAN_RENAME, TRUE);
++}
++
+ static void
+ do_query_info (GVfsBackend *backend,
+                GVfsJobQueryInfo *query_info_job,
+@@ -180,19 +195,57 @@ do_query_info (GVfsBackend *backend,
+   if (error != NULL)
+     goto out;
+ 
+-  /* Override read/write flags, since the above call will use access()
+-   * to determine permissions, which does not honor our privileged
+-   * capabilities.
+-   */
+-  g_file_info_set_attribute_boolean (real_info,
+-                                     G_FILE_ATTRIBUTE_ACCESS_CAN_READ, TRUE);
+-  g_file_info_set_attribute_boolean (real_info,
+-                                     G_FILE_ATTRIBUTE_ACCESS_CAN_WRITE, TRUE);
+-  g_file_info_set_attribute_boolean (real_info,
+-                                     G_FILE_ATTRIBUTE_ACCESS_CAN_DELETE, TRUE);
+-  g_file_info_set_attribute_boolean (real_info,
+-                                     G_FILE_ATTRIBUTE_ACCESS_CAN_RENAME, TRUE);
++  fix_file_info (real_info);
++  g_file_info_copy_into (real_info, info);
++  g_object_unref (real_info);
++
++ out:
++  complete_job (job, error);
++}
++
++static void
++do_query_info_on_read (GVfsBackend *backend,
++                       GVfsJobQueryInfoRead *query_info_job,
++                       GVfsBackendHandle handle,
++                       GFileInfo *info,
++                       GFileAttributeMatcher *matcher)
++{
++  GVfsJob *job = G_VFS_JOB (query_info_job);
++  GFileInputStream *stream = handle;
++  GError *error = NULL;
++  GFileInfo *real_info;
++
++  real_info = g_file_input_stream_query_info (stream, query_info_job->attributes,
++                                              job->cancellable, &error);
++  if (error != NULL)
++    goto out;
++
++  fix_file_info (real_info);
++  g_file_info_copy_into (real_info, info);
++  g_object_unref (real_info);
++
++ out:
++  complete_job (job, error);
++}
++
++static void
++do_query_info_on_write (GVfsBackend *backend,
++                        GVfsJobQueryInfoWrite *query_info_job,
++                        GVfsBackendHandle handle,
++                        GFileInfo *info,
++                        GFileAttributeMatcher *matcher)
++{
++  GVfsJob *job = G_VFS_JOB (query_info_job);
++  GFileOutputStream *stream = handle;
++  GError *error = NULL;
++  GFileInfo *real_info;
++
++  real_info = g_file_output_stream_query_info (stream, query_info_job->attributes,
++                                               job->cancellable, &error);
++  if (error != NULL)
++    goto out;
+ 
++  fix_file_info (real_info);
+   g_file_info_copy_into (real_info, info);
+   g_object_unref (real_info);
+ 
+@@ -868,6 +921,8 @@ g_vfs_backend_admin_class_init (GVfsBackendAdminClass * klass)
+   backend_class->mount = do_mount;
+   backend_class->open_for_read = do_open_for_read;
+   backend_class->query_info = do_query_info;
++  backend_class->query_info_on_read = do_query_info_on_read;
++  backend_class->query_info_on_write = do_query_info_on_write;
+   backend_class->read = do_read;
+   backend_class->create = do_create;
+   backend_class->append_to = do_append_to;

debian/patches/admin-Allow-changing-file-owner.patch

+From: Ondrej Holy <oholy@redhat.com>
+Date: Thu, 23 May 2019 10:29:08 +0200
+Subject: admin: Allow changing file owner
+
+CAP_CHOWN is dropped together with other privilages and thus the backend
+can't change file owner. This might be probably e.g. in case of copy
+operation when G_FILE_COPY_ALL_METADATA is used. Let's keep CAP_CHOWN
+to fix this.
+
+Origin: upstream, 1.38.2, commit:0f25dea30d01d920443ab72b0c254560ec40e14c
+Bug-CVE: CVE-2019-12447
+Bug-Debian: https://bugs.debian.org/cgi-bin/bugreport.cgi?bug=929755
+---
+ daemon/gvfsbackendadmin.c | 3 ++-
+ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/daemon/gvfsbackendadmin.c b/daemon/gvfsbackendadmin.c
+index c4e4dac..2d949ae 100644
+--- a/daemon/gvfsbackendadmin.c
++++ b/daemon/gvfsbackendadmin.c
+@@ -968,7 +968,8 @@ g_vfs_backend_admin_init (GVfsBackendAdmin *self)
+ 
+ #define REQUIRED_CAPS (CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_FOWNER) | \
+                        CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE) | \
+-                       CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH))
++                       CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH) | \
++                       CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_CHOWN))
+ 
+ static void
+ acquire_caps (uid_t uid)

debian/patches/admin-Ensure-correct-ownership-when-moving-to-file-uri.patch

+From: Ondrej Holy <oholy@redhat.com>
+Date: Fri, 24 May 2019 09:43:43 +0200
+Subject: admin: Ensure correct ownership when moving to file:// uri
+
+User and group is not restored properly when moving (or copying with
+G_FILE_COPY_ALL_METADATA) from admin:// to file://, because it is handled
+by GIO fallback code, which doesn't run with root permissions. Let's
+handle this case with pull method to ensure correct ownership.
+
+Origin: upstream, 1.38.2, commit:bed1e9685c9f65f6a3ff3b39dd8547db3e7e77f6
+Bug-CVE: CVE-2019-12449
+Bug-Debian: https://bugs.debian.org/cgi-bin/bugreport.cgi?bug=929755
+---
+ daemon/gvfsbackendadmin.c | 46 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
+ 1 file changed, 46 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/daemon/gvfsbackendadmin.c b/daemon/gvfsbackendadmin.c
+index 71946a0..392824c 100644
+--- a/daemon/gvfsbackendadmin.c
++++ b/daemon/gvfsbackendadmin.c
+@@ -807,6 +807,51 @@ do_move (GVfsBackend *backend,
+   complete_job (job, error);
+ }
+ 
++static void
++do_pull (GVfsBackend *backend,
++         GVfsJobPull *pull_job,
++         const char *source,
++         const char *local_path,
++         GFileCopyFlags flags,
++         gboolean remove_source,
++         GFileProgressCallback progress_callback,
++         gpointer progress_callback_data)
++{
++  GVfsBackendAdmin *self = G_VFS_BACKEND_ADMIN (backend);
++  GVfsJob *job = G_VFS_JOB (pull_job);
++  GError *error = NULL;
++  GFile *src_file, *dst_file;
++
++  /* Pull method is necessary when user/group needs to be restored, return
++   * G_IO_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED in other cases to proceed with the fallback code.
++   */
++  if (!(flags & G_FILE_COPY_ALL_METADATA))
++    {
++      g_vfs_job_failed_literal (G_VFS_JOB (job), G_IO_ERROR,
++                                G_IO_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED,
++                                _("Operation not supported"));
++      return;
++    }
++
++  if (!check_permission (self, job))
++    return;
++
++  src_file = g_file_new_for_path (source);
++  dst_file = g_file_new_for_path (local_path);
++
++  if (remove_source)
++    g_file_move (src_file, dst_file, flags, job->cancellable,
++                 progress_callback, progress_callback_data, &error);
++  else
++    g_file_copy (src_file, dst_file, flags, job->cancellable,
++                 progress_callback, progress_callback_data, &error);
++
++  g_object_unref (src_file);
++  g_object_unref (dst_file);
++
++  complete_job (job, error);
++}
++
+ static void
+ do_query_settable_attributes (GVfsBackend *backend,
+                               GVfsJobQueryAttributes *query_job,
+@@ -927,6 +972,7 @@ g_vfs_backend_admin_class_init (GVfsBackendAdminClass * klass)
+   backend_class->set_attribute = do_set_attribute;
+   backend_class->delete = do_delete;
+   backend_class->move = do_move;
++  backend_class->pull = do_pull;
+   backend_class->query_settable_attributes = do_query_settable_attributes;
+   backend_class->query_writable_namespaces = do_query_writable_namespaces;
+ }

debian/patches/admin-Use-fsuid-to-ensure-correct-file-ownership.patch

+From: Ondrej Holy <oholy@redhat.com>
+Date: Thu, 23 May 2019 10:33:30 +0200
+Subject: admin: Use fsuid to ensure correct file ownership
+
+Files created over admin backend should be owned by root, but they are
+owned by the user itself. This is because the daemon drops the uid to
+make dbus connection work. Use fsuid and euid to fix this issue.
+
+Bug: https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/gvfs/issues/21
+Origin: upstream, 1.38.2, commit:272e6bdac33309672955e8f8bf1b8f5f1e51fa0a
+Bug-CVE: CVE-2019-12447
+Bug-Debian: https://bugs.debian.org/cgi-bin/bugreport.cgi?bug=929755
+---
+ daemon/gvfsbackendadmin.c | 29 +++++++----------------------
+ 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 22 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/daemon/gvfsbackendadmin.c b/daemon/gvfsbackendadmin.c
+index 2d949ae..71946a0 100644
+--- a/daemon/gvfsbackendadmin.c
++++ b/daemon/gvfsbackendadmin.c
+@@ -157,19 +157,6 @@ complete_job (GVfsJob *job,
+   g_vfs_job_succeeded (job);
+ }
+ 
+-static void
+-fix_file_info (GFileInfo *info)
+-{
+-  /* Override read/write flags, since the above call will use access()
+-   * to determine permissions, which does not honor our privileged
+-   * capabilities.
+-   */
+-  g_file_info_set_attribute_boolean (info, G_FILE_ATTRIBUTE_ACCESS_CAN_READ, TRUE);
+-  g_file_info_set_attribute_boolean (info, G_FILE_ATTRIBUTE_ACCESS_CAN_WRITE, TRUE);
+-  g_file_info_set_attribute_boolean (info, G_FILE_ATTRIBUTE_ACCESS_CAN_DELETE, TRUE);
+-  g_file_info_set_attribute_boolean (info, G_FILE_ATTRIBUTE_ACCESS_CAN_RENAME, TRUE);
+-}
+-
+ static void
+ do_query_info (GVfsBackend *backend,
+                GVfsJobQueryInfo *query_info_job,
+@@ -195,7 +182,6 @@ do_query_info (GVfsBackend *backend,
+   if (error != NULL)
+     goto out;
+ 
+-  fix_file_info (real_info);
+   g_file_info_copy_into (real_info, info);
+   g_object_unref (real_info);
+ 
+@@ -220,7 +206,6 @@ do_query_info_on_read (GVfsBackend *backend,
+   if (error != NULL)
+     goto out;
+ 
+-  fix_file_info (real_info);
+   g_file_info_copy_into (real_info, info);
+   g_object_unref (real_info);
+ 
+@@ -245,7 +230,6 @@ do_query_info_on_write (GVfsBackend *backend,
+   if (error != NULL)
+     goto out;
+ 
+-  fix_file_info (real_info);
+   g_file_info_copy_into (real_info, info);
+   g_object_unref (real_info);
+ 
+@@ -977,14 +961,15 @@ acquire_caps (uid_t uid)
+   struct __user_cap_header_struct hdr;
+   struct __user_cap_data_struct data;
+ 
+-  /* Tell kernel not clear capabilities when dropping root */
+-  if (prctl (PR_SET_KEEPCAPS, 1, 0, 0, 0) < 0)
+-    g_error ("prctl(PR_SET_KEEPCAPS) failed");
+-
+-  /* Drop root uid, but retain the required permitted caps */
+-  if (setuid (uid) < 0)
++  /* Set euid to user to make dbus work */
++  if (seteuid (uid) < 0)
+     g_error ("unable to drop privs");
+ 
++  /* Set fsuid to still behave like root when working with files */
++  setfsuid (0);
++  if (setfsuid (-1) != 0)
++   g_error ("setfsuid failed");
++
+   memset (&hdr, 0, sizeof(hdr));
+   hdr.version = _LINUX_CAPABILITY_VERSION;
+ 

debian/patches/gvfsdaemon-Check-that-the-connecting-client-is-the-same-u.patch

+From: Simon McVittie <smcv@collabora.com>
+Date: Wed, 5 Jun 2019 13:33:38 +0100
+Subject: gvfsdaemon: Check that the connecting client is the same user
+
+Otherwise, an attacker who learns the abstract socket address from
+netstat(8) or similar could connect to it and issue D-Bus method
+calls.
+
+Signed-off-by: Simon McVittie <smcv@collabora.com>
+Applied-upstream: 1.38.3, commit:e3808a1b4042761055b1d975333a8243d67b8bfe
+---
+ daemon/gvfsdaemon.c | 36 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
+ 1 file changed, 35 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/daemon/gvfsdaemon.c b/daemon/gvfsdaemon.c
+index 406d4f8..be148a7 100644
+--- a/daemon/gvfsdaemon.c
++++ b/daemon/gvfsdaemon.c
+@@ -79,6 +79,7 @@ struct _GVfsDaemon
+   
+   gint mount_counter;
+   
++  GDBusAuthObserver *auth_observer;
+   GDBusConnection *conn;
+   GVfsDBusDaemon *daemon_skeleton;
+   GVfsDBusMountable *mountable_skeleton;
+@@ -171,6 +172,8 @@ g_vfs_daemon_finalize (GObject *object)
+     }
+   if (daemon->conn != NULL)
+     g_object_unref (daemon->conn);
++  if (daemon->auth_observer != NULL)
++    g_object_unref (daemon->auth_observer);
+   
+   g_hash_table_destroy (daemon->registered_paths);
+   g_hash_table_destroy (daemon->client_connections);
+@@ -236,6 +239,35 @@ name_vanished_handler (GDBusConnection *connection,
+   daemon->lost_main_daemon = TRUE;
+ }
+ 
++/*
++ * Authentication observer signal handler that authorizes connections
++ * from the same uid as this process. This matches the behaviour of a
++ * libdbus DBusServer/DBusConnection when no DBusAllowUnixUserFunction
++ * has been set, but is not the default in GDBus.
++ */
++static gboolean
++authorize_authenticated_peer_cb (GDBusAuthObserver *observer,
++                                 G_GNUC_UNUSED GIOStream *stream,
++                                 GCredentials *credentials,
++                                 G_GNUC_UNUSED gpointer user_data)
++{
++  gboolean authorized = FALSE;
++
++  if (credentials != NULL)
++    {
++      GCredentials *own_credentials;
++
++      own_credentials = g_credentials_new ();
++
++      if (g_credentials_is_same_user (credentials, own_credentials, NULL))
++        authorized = TRUE;
++
++      g_object_unref (own_credentials);
++    }
++
++  return authorized;
++}
++
+ static void
+ g_vfs_daemon_init (GVfsDaemon *daemon)
+ {
+@@ -265,6 +297,8 @@ g_vfs_daemon_init (GVfsDaemon *daemon)
+ 
+   daemon->conn = g_bus_get_sync (G_BUS_TYPE_SESSION, NULL, NULL);
+   g_assert (daemon->conn != NULL);
++  daemon->auth_observer = g_dbus_auth_observer_new ();
++  g_signal_connect (daemon->auth_observer, "authorize-authenticated-peer", G_CALLBACK (authorize_authenticated_peer_cb), NULL);
+ 
+   daemon->daemon_skeleton = gvfs_dbus_daemon_skeleton_new ();
+   g_signal_connect (daemon->daemon_skeleton, "handle-get-connection", G_CALLBACK (handle_get_connection), daemon);
+@@ -876,7 +910,7 @@ handle_get_connection (GVfsDBusDaemon *object,
+   server = g_dbus_server_new_sync (address1,
+                                    G_DBUS_SERVER_FLAGS_NONE,
+                                    guid,
+-                                   NULL, /* GDBusAuthObserver */
++                                   daemon->auth_observer,
+                                    NULL, /* GCancellable */
+                                    &error);
+   g_free (guid);

debian/patches/gvfsdaemon-Only-accept-EXTERNAL-authentication.patch

+From: Simon McVittie <smcv@collabora.com>
+Date: Wed, 5 Jun 2019 13:36:52 +0100
+Subject: gvfsdaemon: Only accept EXTERNAL authentication
+
+EXTERNAL is the mechanism recommended in the D-Bus Specification for
+all platforms where it is supported (including Linux, *BSD, Solaris
+and Hurd), and is the only mechanism allowed by the session or system
+dbus-daemon in their default configurations. It is considerably simpler
+than DBUS_COOKIE_SHA1 and relies on fewer assumptions.
+
+Signed-off-by: Simon McVittie <smcv@collabora.com>
+Applied-upstream: 1.38.3, commit:756edf6692aa245faedc9573bf88bfe78af3ead3
+---
+ daemon/gvfsdaemon.c | 17 +++++++++++++++++
+ 1 file changed, 17 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/daemon/gvfsdaemon.c b/daemon/gvfsdaemon.c
+index be148a7..0946f41 100644
+--- a/daemon/gvfsdaemon.c
++++ b/daemon/gvfsdaemon.c
+@@ -239,6 +239,22 @@ name_vanished_handler (GDBusConnection *connection,
+   daemon->lost_main_daemon = TRUE;
+ }
+ 
++/*
++ * Authentication observer signal handler that rejects all authentication
++ * mechanisms except for EXTERNAL (credentials-passing), which is the
++ * recommended authentication mechanism for AF_UNIX sockets.
++ */
++static gboolean
++allow_mechanism_cb (GDBusAuthObserver *observer,
++                    const gchar *mechanism,
++                    G_GNUC_UNUSED gpointer user_data)
++{
++  if (g_strcmp0 (mechanism, "EXTERNAL") == 0)
++    return TRUE;
++
++  return FALSE;
++}
++
+ /*
+  * Authentication observer signal handler that authorizes connections
+  * from the same uid as this process. This matches the behaviour of a
+@@ -298,6 +314,7 @@ g_vfs_daemon_init (GVfsDaemon *daemon)
+   daemon->conn = g_bus_get_sync (G_BUS_TYPE_SESSION, NULL, NULL);
+   g_assert (daemon->conn != NULL);
+   daemon->auth_observer = g_dbus_auth_observer_new ();
++  g_signal_connect (daemon->auth_observer, "allow-mechanism", G_CALLBACK (allow_mechanism_cb), NULL);
+   g_signal_connect (daemon->auth_observer, "authorize-authenticated-peer", G_CALLBACK (authorize_authenticated_peer_cb), NULL);
+ 
+   daemon->daemon_skeleton = gvfs_dbus_daemon_skeleton_new ();

debian/patches/ref-jobs-in-thread.patch

@@ -39,10 +39,10 @@ index c0c26da..fa490f6 100644
  }
  
 diff --git a/daemon/gvfsdaemon.c b/daemon/gvfsdaemon.c
-index 406d4f8..61e5904 100644
+index 0946f41..e35d7f7 100644
 --- a/daemon/gvfsdaemon.c
 +++ b/daemon/gvfsdaemon.c
-@@ -206,6 +206,7 @@ job_handler_callback (gpointer       data,
+@@ -209,6 +209,7 @@ job_handler_callback (gpointer       data,
    GVfsJob *job = G_VFS_JOB (data);
  
    g_vfs_job_run (job);
@@ -50,7 +50,7 @@ index 406d4f8..61e5904 100644
  }
  
  static void
-@@ -597,7 +598,8 @@ g_vfs_daemon_queue_job (GVfsDaemon *daemon,
+@@ -648,7 +649,8 @@ g_vfs_daemon_queue_job (GVfsDaemon *daemon,
    if (!g_vfs_job_try (job))
      {
        /* Couldn't finish / run async, queue worker thread */
@@ -60,7 +60,7 @@ index 406d4f8..61e5904 100644
      }
  }
  
-@@ -1118,7 +1120,8 @@ void
+@@ -1169,7 +1171,8 @@ void
  g_vfs_daemon_run_job_in_thread (GVfsDaemon *daemon,
  				GVfsJob    *job)
  {

debian/patches/series

@@ -6,6 +6,12 @@ Update-Basque-translation.patch
 udisks2-Restore-support-of-comment-x-gvfs-option.patch
 admin-Prevent-access-if-any-authentication-agent-isn-t-av.patch
 mtp-Don-t-retry-reading-an-event-after-failure.patch
+admin-Add-query_info_on_read-write-functionality.patch
+admin-Allow-changing-file-owner.patch
+admin-Use-fsuid-to-ensure-correct-file-ownership.patch
+admin-Ensure-correct-ownership-when-moving-to-file-uri.patch
+gvfsdaemon-Check-that-the-connecting-client-is-the-same-u.patch
+gvfsdaemon-Only-accept-EXTERNAL-authentication.patch
 02_polkit_sudo_group.patch
 metadata-nuke-junk-data.patch
 dont-crash-on-null-job.patch