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pkg
glib2.0
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!47
Backport v2024 <- v2025: Update from debian/bookworm
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Backport v2024 <- v2025: Update from debian/bookworm
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debian/patches/gsocks4aproxy-Fix-a-single-byte-buffer-overflow-in-connec.patch
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From: Michael Catanzaro <mcatanzaro@redhat.com>
Date: Thu, 19 Sep 2024 18:35:53 +0100
Subject: gsocks4aproxy: Fix a single byte buffer overflow in connect messages
`SOCKS4_CONN_MSG_LEN` failed to account for the length of the final nul
byte in the connect message, which is an addition in SOCKSv4a vs
SOCKSv4.
This means that the buffer for building and transmitting the connect
message could be overflowed if the username and hostname are both
`SOCKS4_MAX_LEN` (255) bytes long.
Proxy configurations are normally statically configured, so the username
is very unlikely to be near its maximum length, and hence this overflow
is unlikely to be triggered in practice.
(Commit message by Philip Withnall, diagnosis and fix by Michael
Catanzaro.)
CVE-2024-52533
Bug: https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/glib/-/issues/3461
Bug-Debian: https://bugs.debian.org/1087419
Origin: upstream, 2.82.1, commit:ec0b708b981af77fef8e4bbb603cde4de4cd2e29
---
gio/gsocks4aproxy.c | 4 ++--
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/gio/gsocks4aproxy.c b/gio/gsocks4aproxy.c
index 3dad118..b3146d0 100644
--- a/gio/gsocks4aproxy.c
+++ b/gio/gsocks4aproxy.c
@@ -79,9 +79,9 @@
g_socks4a_proxy_init (GSocks4aProxy *proxy)
* +----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+....+----+------+....+------+
* | VN | CD | DSTPORT | DSTIP | USERID |NULL| HOST | | NULL |
* +----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+....+----+------+....+------+
- * 1 1 2 4 variable 1 variable
+ * 1 1 2 4 variable 1 variable 1
*/
-#define SOCKS4_CONN_MSG_LEN (9 + SOCKS4_MAX_LEN * 2)
+#define SOCKS4_CONN_MSG_LEN (10 + SOCKS4_MAX_LEN * 2)
static gint
set_connect_msg (guint8 *msg,
const gchar *hostname,
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