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  1. Mar 24, 2021
    • Denis Pynkin's avatar
      Add bootable APT image for rk3399 SoC · 9cdaffb7
      Denis Pynkin authored
      
      The recipe creates the image for rockpro64 board bootable
      with MMC or EMMC bootable devices.
      
      New variable `sbc` (single-board computer) is introduced for selecting
      the target device. This variable is needed for proper U-Boot files
      selection and should have the same name as U-Boot directory targeting
      to this device under `/usr/lib/u-boot/`:
       - firefly-rk3399
       - pinebook-pro-rk3399
       - puma-rk3399
       - rock-pi-4-rk3399
       - rock64-rk3328
       - rockpro64-rk3399
      
      "rock-pi-4-rk3399" is used as a default target device.
      
      Signed-off-by: default avatarDenis Pynkin <denis.pynkin@collabora.com>
      9cdaffb7
  2. Mar 08, 2021
    • Peter Senna Tschudin's avatar
      Add sdk user to the sudo group to fix blueman regression · f5ae347e
      Peter Senna Tschudin authored and Emanuele Aina's avatar Emanuele Aina committed
      The user account `user` that is created on the SDK already has sudo
      powers. However this user account is not part of the sudo group.
      
      With the upgrade of blueman from 2.0.8-1co1 to 2.0.8-1+deb10u1co1
      this has was now causing an error dialog saying that
      "You might not be able to connect to the Bluetooth network via this machine":
      
      https://github.com/blueman-project/blueman/issues/948
      
      
      
      It seems that polkit was disabled and the update which came from
      debian-security to fix CVE-2020-15238 enabled it:
      
      > Blueman is a GTK+ Bluetooth Manager. In Blueman before 2.1.4, the
      > DhcpClient method of the D-Bus interface to blueman-mechanism is prone
      > to an argument injection vulnerability. The impact highly depends on the
      > system configuration. If Polkit-1 is disabled and for versions lower
      > than 2.0.6, any local user can possibly exploit this. If Polkit-1 is
      > enabled for version 2.0.6 and later, a possible attacker needs to be
      > allowed to use the `org.blueman.dhcp.client` action. That is limited to
      > users in the wheel group in the shipped rules file that do have the
      > privileges anyway. On systems with ISC DHCP client (dhclient), attackers
      > can pass arguments to `ip link` with the interface name that can e.g. be
      > used to bring down an interface or add an arbitrary XDP/BPF program. On
      > systems with dhcpcd and without ISC DHCP client, attackers can even run
      > arbitrary scripts by passing `-c/path/to/script` as an interface name.
      > Patches are included in 2.1.4 and master that change the DhcpClient
      > D-Bus method(s) to accept BlueZ network object paths instead of network
      > interface names. A backport to 2.0(.8) is also available. As a
      > workaround, make sure that Polkit-1-support is enabled and limit
      > privileges for the `org.blueman.dhcp.client` action to users that are
      > able to run arbitrary commands as root anyway in
      > /usr/share/polkit-1/rules.d/blueman.rules.
      
      With polkit now being enabled, this snippets becomes relevant:
      
      ```
      $ sudo cat /usr/share/polkit-1/rules.d/blueman.rules
      // Allow users in sudo or netdev group to use blueman feature requiring root without authentication
      polkit.addRule(function(action, subject) {
          if ((action.id == "org.blueman.network.setup" ||
               action.id == "org.blueman.dhcp.client" ||
               action.id == "org.blueman.rfkill.setstate" ||
               action.id == "org.blueman.pppd.pppconnect") &&
              subject.local && subject.active &&
              (subject.isInGroup("sudo") || subject.isInGroup("netdev"))) {
              return polkit.Result.YES;
          }
      });
      ```
      
      Adding the user to the `sudo` group would then make blueman happy again.
      
      Signed-off-by: default avatarPeter Senna Tschudin <peter.senna@collabora.com>
      f5ae347e
  3. Mar 02, 2021
  4. Feb 16, 2021
  5. Feb 03, 2021
  6. Jan 27, 2021
  7. Jan 21, 2021
  8. Jan 10, 2021
  9. Jan 08, 2021
  10. Jan 02, 2021
    • Emanuele Aina's avatar
      gitlab-ci: Keep capturing bundles as artifacts for hawkBit · 23131228
      Emanuele Aina authored
      
      Commit 0f98e2a4 "gitlab-ci: Try to upload artifacts immediately" was
      a bit too eager to skip capturing all OSTree bundles when in fact we
      still need to capture the main update bundles to upload them to hawkBit.
      
      Putting the hawkBit upload directly in the job building the bundles
      would be a better option, but it seems too early since the hawkBit
      upload has been restored only recently and it may still be flaky, so
      a dedicated jobw with `allow_failure: true` still seems appropriate.
      
      Signed-off-by: Emanuele Aina's avatarEmanuele Aina <emanuele.aina@collabora.com>
      23131228
  11. Dec 21, 2020
  12. Dec 20, 2020
  13. Dec 18, 2020
  14. Dec 17, 2020
  15. Dec 16, 2020
  16. Dec 15, 2020
  17. Dec 10, 2020
  18. Dec 08, 2020
  19. Dec 07, 2020
  20. Dec 03, 2020
  21. Dec 02, 2020
  22. Nov 25, 2020
  23. Nov 18, 2020
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