Commit ed809a92 authored by Emanuele Aina's avatar Emanuele Aina

security: Misc minor improvements to the text

An otherwise unrelated collection of changes to make the text a bit
easier to read.
Signed-off-by: Emanuele Aina's avatarEmanuele Aina <emanuele.aina@collabora.com>

Differential Revision: https://phabricator.apertis.org/D3968
parent eba2e172
......@@ -189,7 +189,7 @@ application, or by applications with a “Manage Downloads” privilege
application).
As another example, a platform service for app-bundle installation might
have the policy the trusted “Application Installer” HMI is the only
have a policy stating that the trusted “Application Installer” HMI is the only
component permitted to install or remove app-bundles. Depending on the
desired trade-off between privacy and flexibility, the policy might be
that any application may read the list of installed app-bundles, that
......@@ -575,7 +575,7 @@ MeeGo before that project was cancelled; [Tizen] appears to be the
only general-purpose Linux distribution using SMACK as of 2015.
SMACK works by assigning labels to the same system objects and to
processes SELinux does; similar capabilities were proposed by Intel for
processes as SELinux does; similar capabilities were proposed by Intel for
D-Bus integration, but their originators did not follow up on
[reviews][SMACK-reviews], and the changes were not merged. SMACK also relies on
extended file system attributes for the labels, which means it suffers
......@@ -659,11 +659,11 @@ actuality be dropping privileges, not escalating them, since the
restrictions imposed on binaries that do not have their own profile can
be quite extensive.
Note, too, that Collabora is proposing mounting partitions that should
Note that Collabora is proposing mounting partitions that should
only contain data with the option that disallows execution of code
contained in them, so even if the user manages to escape the strict
containment of the user session and copied a binary to one of the
directories they have write access to they would not be able to run it.
directories they have write access to, they would not be able to run it.
Refer to the System updates & rollback and Application designs for more
details on file system and partition configuration.
......@@ -675,8 +675,8 @@ parser, and to dbus-daemon, so that it will check with AppArmor before
allowing a request.
AppArmor will be used by shipping profiles for all components of the
platform, and by requiring that third-party applications shipped with
their own profiles that specified exactly what requests the application
platform, and by requiring that third-party applications ship with
their own profiles that specify exactly what requests the application
should be allowed.
Creating a new profile for AppArmor is a reasonably simple process: a
......@@ -804,7 +804,7 @@ labeled resource, so when reading or writing a file all read/write
operations would cause a check. That means making larger operations
instead of several smaller ones would also make the overhead go down.
AppArmor does fewer checks than SELinux, in general, since only
AppArmor generally does fewer checks than SELinux since only
operations that open, map or execute a file are checked: the individual
read/write operations that follow are not checked independently.
Novell's documentation and FAQs state a 0.2% overhead is expected on
......@@ -2013,11 +2013,11 @@ consideration.
How security impacts a developer mode depends heavily on how that
developer mode of work is specified. This chapter considers that the two
main use cases for such a mode would be installing an application
directly to the target through the Eclipse install to target plugin and
directly to the target through the Eclipse *install to target* plugin and
running a remote debugging session for the application, both of which
are topics discussed in the SDK design.
The install to target functionality that was made available through an
The *install to target* functionality that was made available through an
Eclipse plugin uses an **sftp** connection with an arbitrary user and
password pair to connect to the device. This means that putting the
device in developer mode should ensure the **ssh** server is running and
......@@ -2033,7 +2033,7 @@ application needs to be installed or be able to tell the application
installer to install it.
The procedure for installing an application using an **sftp** connection
is not too different from the install app from USB stick use case
is not too different from the *install app from USB stick* use case
described in the Applications document, that similarity could be
exploited to share code for these features.
......
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